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Article 11

Comment: The Folly of
Overfederalization
by
S~ANoR H. KADISH*

Professor Blakey argues that federalization is an arid and
unuseful abstraction that distracts attention from the salient issue of
how most effectively to deal with the problem of crime in the United
States.' He prefers a factual and pragmatic assessment of what needs
to be done to meet the challenge of crime without needless preoccupation with issues of federalism. I agree with his defense of pragmatism, but his dismissal of federalism seems to me a bit overdone.
Federalism, after all, is one of the salient principles on which the
Republic was founded. Its virtues are well known: a closer and more
direct identification of individual citizens with their government,
greater control by them of the policies to be furthered, and the national benefits of variation and experimentation. These early recognized virtues continue to be recognized down to the present; witness
the Republican Party's "Contract With America." In saying this I
don't mean to put federalism on a pedestal, only to protest Professor
Blakey's dismissal of it as an arid and unuseful abstraction. It is by no
means everything, but it is certainly something.
I think most would agree that whatever the virtues of federalism,
they would apply to criminal legislation and enforcement. It is curious, though, that crime is the one area of traditional state and local
concern where even strongly federally oriented politicians often support national intervention. Why should that be? Of course, there's a
vital national interest in the reduction of crime. But is the national
interest any greater than that in the health of the population, the effects of impoverishment, or welfare? In these areas, the same politicians pushing for increased federal criminal legislation turn into
ardent federalists. That seems to me a paradox. But I will not pursue
it here. Instead, I want to suggest reasons for wondering whether, to
the contrary, crime may be one of the areas where the case for na* Morrison Professor of Law, Emeritus, University of California, Berkeley.
1. G. Robert Blakey, Federal Criminal Law: The Need, Not for Revised Constitutional Statutes, But the Exercise of Responsible Prosecutive Discretion,in this Symposium
Issue.
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tional assertion of authority has less rather than greater justificationand on pragmatic grounds.
No one can doubt Congress's virtual plenary authority over criminal matters as a consequence of the Supreme Court's expansive interpretation of the Commerce Clause. In the argument before the
Supreme Court in the recent case of United States v. Lopez, 2 it fell to
the Solicitor General to defend the constitutionality of the 1990 GunFree School Zones Act, which makes it a federal crime to carry a gun
within a thousand feet of a school. Seeking reversal of the Fifth Circuit, which could not quite see what Congress was doing meddling
with security measures in local schools, the Solicitor General invoked
the well-settled doctrine that anything which impacts interstate commerce is within the commerce power. That seemed to startle some of
the Justices. Justice Ginsburg was moved to ask, apparently in the
spirit of a reductio ad absurdum, whether under this theory all violent
crime in America could not be claimed by the national authority. The
Solicitor General forthrightly replied in the affirmative, and under the
existing precedents he was quite right.3 But the question
to be faced
4
here is not congressional power but its wise exercise.
For most of American history, law enforcement has primarily
been a state and local matter. It is still pretty much that way. Only a
small percentage of prisoners, police officers, criminal courts, and
prosecutors are federal. But recent years have witnessed a considerable expansion of federal authority, particularly in the last decade, with
the increasing effect of turning traditional state offenses into federal
ones, raising some serious cause for concern.
Drug crimes have been for some time the biggest worry on this
score, and I will say something about drugs at the end. But let me first
call attention to some recent examples of what strike me as creeping
and foolish federal overcriminalization. How it happens is familiar
enough from watching the enactment of state criminal laws. Some
dramatic crimes or series of crimes are given conspicuous media coverage, producing what is perceived, and often is, widespread public
anxiety. Seeking to make political hay, some legislator proposes a
new law to make this or that a major felony or to raise the penalty or
otherwise tighten the screws. Since other legislators know well that
no one can lose voter popularity for seeming to be tough on crime, the
legislation sails through in a breeze. That the chances of the legisla2. 2 F.3d 1342 (5th Cir. 1993), affid, No. 93-1260, 1995 U.S. LEXIS 3039 (U.S., Apr.
26, 1995).
3. Lyle Denniston, Going Overboardfor a Federal Gun Law, Am. LAw., Jan./Feb.
1995, at 94.
4. In these reflections I have benefited greatly from an opportunity to read in manuscript form Frank Zimring & Gordon Hawkins, Toward a Principled Basis for Federal
CriminalLegislation, Ti-rE ANNALS (forthcoming 1995).
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tion working to reduce crime are exceedingly low, and in some cases
the chances of it doing harm are very high, scarcely seems to be a
relevant issue.
Now this process seems to be taking place in Congress as well.
An example is the Gun-Free School Zones Act I mentioned. Another
is the 1994 provision of federal penalties for armed carjacking. Bills
proposed, but not yet successful, raise further examples. Take the bill
proposed in 1991 and again in 1993 making it a federal crime to commit any state crime with a firearm that crossed state lines.5 Because
virtually all firearms cross state lines, the proposal would federalize all
crimes committed with guns, thereby giving Congress legislative authority over most violent crimes in America. Another 1991 proposal 6
would criminalize many kinds of domestic violence cases, potentially
involving federal courts in a flood of domestic relations disputes.
What's wrong with this? First, it tends to subvert the values of a
federal system to which I referred. The problem is not the lack of
constitutional authority nor the absence of a national interest in keeping children from carrying guns to school, in deterring the criminal use
of guns generally, in suppressing violence against women, and so on.
There is such an interest, of course. But the fact that deplorable conduct is widespread in the United States, and in that sense constitutes a
national problem, hardly warrants making that conduct a federal
crime when it is already adequately covered by state law. If it were
otherwise, we might have a federal criminal law almost entirely duplicative of state criminal codes, and one that would preempt the state
law wherever Congress chose. The second thing wrong with
overfederalization of crime is that it is a wasteful duplication of resources where federal resources are desperately needed for other
functions. And finally, the legislative product tends to be no better
than the process that produced it-the process of congressmen and
women following the politically profitable example of state legislators
in buying popularity with essentially bogus anticrime laws. It leads to
federalizing street-type crimes-guns at school, domestic violence,
etc., -whose enforcement requires the kind of on-site policing that
the federal criminal system has never been any good at. And it leads
to the enactment of laws that cater to public clamor by falsely offering
severity as a cure-"Three Strikes and You're Out," high mandatory
minimums, extensions of capital punishment, and sentencing policies
that drive conscientious federal judges to distraction.
5. Violent Crime Control Act of 1991, S. 1241, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess. § 1213; Violent
Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1993, H.R. 3355, 103rd Cong., 1st Sess.

§ 2405.
6.

Violence Against Women Act of 1991, S. 15, 102nd Cong., 1st Sess.
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Of course, this is not to say that there are no areas where federal
criminal law is appropriate, only that the fact that certain crimes are
committed everywhere in the country does not warrant the enactment
of federal criminal laws to deal with them. What more should be required? Professors Zimring and Hawkins have proposed several possible justifications for federal crime: 7 (i) where the federal interest is
stronger and more direct than the interest of the states; for example,
where the national government has a proprietary interest, as with
counterfeiting, tax evasion, assault on a federal officer, espionage, national security legislation, etc.; (ii) where federal agencies enjoy a distinct comparative advantage in detecting, gathering evidence, and
prosecuting, as in the case of organized crime; or (iii) where state and
local law enforcement prove to be demonstrably inadequate to control
some objectionable conduct. These may need adding to or further refining, but at least they are a start at limiting and rationalizing the
pattern of congressional overcriminalization. Surely, the kind of new
federal crimes of which I gave examples-carjacking, domestic violence, guns in schools-would scarcely pass muster under such
criteria.
By and large there has been little opposition to the spread of federal criminal jurisdiction. Encouraging exceptions have been federal
judiciary and bar spokespersons, whose principal concerns have been
the diversion of national resources from the administration of civil justice. Chief Justice Rehnquist 8 and Robert Raven, former President of
the American Bar Association, 9 have made eloquent statements of the
baleful consequences of this spread, apparent in the seventy percent
increase in criminal filings between 1980 and 1992 compared with a
thirty-four percent increase in civil filings. 10 These consequences were
vividly portrayed by Chief Judge Judith Keep of the Southern District
of California, who has noted, according to Mr. Raven, that her district
tries fewer than fifty of the one thousand civil cases filed each year
and spends more than seventy percent of its time on routine drug and
gun cases. Judge Keep concludes that as a result her court is "sinking
in a mire of criminal cases" that has turned it largely into a "police
court" where judges are under "constant pressure to keep cases mov7. See Zimring & Hawkins, supra note 4.
8. Hon. William H. Rehnquist, 1991 Year-End Report on the FederalJudiciary,102nd
Cong., 2nd Sess., 138 CONG. REC. S443-01 (daily ed. Jan. 27, 1992).
9. Robert Raven, Federal Courts as Police Courts: Federalism Revisited, Fifth Circuit Judicial Conference (May 13, 1993). An earlier version of this address appears in
Robert Raven, Don't Wage War on Crime in Federal Courts, THE RECORDER, Aug. 11,
1992, at 8.
10. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1981 STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 186 tbl. 324; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 1993 STATnSTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 206 tbls. 331, 333.
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ing as fast as possible." And Chief Justice Rehnquist told Congress in
a recent report that "[w]e must decide whether we want the federal
courts to spend the majority of their time hearing general criminal
cases or whether we want the federal courts to occupy their traditional
role as a forum for civil disputes on nationally important issues such as
commerce, constitutional questions, civil rights and civil liberties.""1
So, to sum up, the costs of the further spread of federal criminal
law are substantial: not only is there the threat of the breakdown of
our federal civil justice system to which our judicial and bar leaders
have called attention, but also the needless compromise of the virtues
of federalism, the waste of resources with duplicating systems doing
much the same thing, and finally, the net increase and nationalization
of knee-jerk legislation.
I must conclude these comments with a word about drugs, for to
talk about overfederalization without mentioning drugs is like talking
about Hamlet without the Prince or to use a more pertinent image
like narrating a melodrama without its arch villain. This is because
drug control laws constitute perhaps the most sustained expansion of
federal criminal jurisdiction in our history. Federal drug filings rose
three hundred percent between 1980 and 1993.12 They constituted
nearly forty percent of all federal felony filings in 1992.13 Another
telling statistic is that in 1993 close to sixty percent of all federal prisoners were being held for drug offenses. 14 The cost in dollars and,
cents as well is in the kinds of costs I've talked about are exceedingly
high. The question I want to leave you with is this: Have the results
of the decades-long war on drugs been worth it? It is always possible
things would have been worse without the federal legislation, but it
takes a lot of imagination to see how. There is indeed a comparative
advantage enjoyed by federal authority over certain aspects of drug
control-for example, importation and interstate shipments of drugs.
But the bulk of federal cases are not of that sort, but of the ordinary
drug-related street crimes in the cities of this country. Surely our prevailing drug control policies need rethinking. There is no easy answer.
But it is not at all difficult to see that withdrawal of federal policing of
the countless drug-related crimes committed on the streets of our cities would make sense from every relevant perspective while we struggle to find a way out of the wilderness of our drug problems.
11.
12.

Raven, Federal Courts, supra note 9.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, 1981 STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 186 tbl. 324; BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF
COMMERCE, 1993 STATISTICAL ABSTRACr OF THE UNITED STATES 206 tbl. 333.
13. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, 1993 SOURCEBOOK OF
CRImuINAL JUSTICE STATISTICS 499-503, tbls. 5.28, 5.29.
14. IL at 630 tbl. 6.67.

